Abstract: Many novel, effective, and efficient applications and networking services are being developed for the Social Internet of Things. Recently, Li proposed a more secure and efficient authentication scheme with roaming service and user anonymity for mobile communications. The security analysis and discussion of the agreement phase is sufficiently safe; however, an attacker can intercept the identity of a mobile user's home agent in the authentication phase. By using this information, the attacker can mount distributed denial-of-service attacks in the roaming phase through replay attacks targeting the network's foreign agent and mobile user's home agent by using their corresponding session keys. Li's method also has some shortcomings regarding anonymity that we aim to address. To overcome these issues, this study proposes an elliptic curve-based wireless roaming anonymous login method for the authentication phase. The problems faced in the roaming phase are resolved, and this approach provides balanced session key computation between senders and receivers. Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic (BAN-logic) is used to verify the security of the proposed scheme. The proposed scheme affords good security, efficiency, and integrity and maintains anonymity.
Introduction
Wireless networks and smartphones have undergone rapid developments, allowing the use of the same device across different networks [1, 2] . Users such as businessmen or tourists visiting a new area can use a smart card to register with their home agents. Such cards use an anonymous connection to register to the home agent from the foreign agent server [3, 4] . After validation, a temporary certificate is sent to the user. The user may use this temporary certificate for network roaming via the foreign agent server. This approach can provide billing information while maintaining anonymity [5] [6] [7] [8] .
In general, an anonymous roaming scheme has three entities: mobile user (MU), foreign agent (FA), and home agent (HA) [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . In communication, the user must remain anonymous to the other entities. This scheme consists of three phases: registration (initialization phase), authentication (first phase), and roaming (second phase) [14] [15] [16] . When an MU is anonymously roaming in a foreign network, it can use one of two methods: real-time online and offline. Real-time online means that when a user requests roaming permissions, the FA can immediately authenticate with the HA and verify the user's legitimacy. The FA is unaware of the user's true identity but only knows whether the user is legitimate.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review Li's scheme [27] . His scheme consists of three phases: registration, authentication, and roaming, of which the authentication phase is real-time online.
Li's Scheme
For simplicity, we list the common notations used throughout Li's scheme in Table 1 . The foreign agent of the network ID MU The MU's identity PW MU The MU's password N A strong secret key of the HA T A Timestamp generated by an entity A Cert A Certificate of an entity A (X) K Encryption of a message X using a symmetric key K (P A ,S A )
The asymmetric public key and private key pair of an entity A based on Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) E P An elliptic curve equation, over a finite field p: y 2 = x 3 + ax + b mod p, where p > 2 16 • , n > 2 160 , a and b are two integer elements and 4a 3 + 27b 2 mod p =0 E An elliptic curve equation of HA choose p, n Two large prime numbers P A base point with the order n over E SK HF A pre-shared symmetric key between HA and FA ⊕ Exclusive-OR (XOR) operation H(.)
A collision-free one-way hash function || Concatenation 2.1.1. Registration Phase
The MU chooses the identity ID MU , password PW MU , and a random number r n ; calculates H(PW MU ⊕r n ); and sends the registration request message {ID MU , H(PW MU ⊕r n )} to the HA.
R2
. HA→MU: m LR2 {ID HA , E p , E, n, P, P HA , z, H(.)} When the registration request message {ID MU , H(PW MU ⊕r n )} is received from the MU, the HA calculates H(ID MU ||N) and z = H(PW MU ⊕r n )⊕H(ID MU ||N). Then, the HA sends ID HA , E p , E, n, P, P HA , z, and H(.) to the MU.
R3
. MU: ID HA , E p , E, n, P, P HA , z, H(.)
After the message {ID HA , E p , E, n, P, P HA , z, H(.)} is received from the HA, the MU stores this information along with r n onto the smart card. This completes the registration phase. The MU calculates m i = (TCert MU ||sk i+1 ||Other) ski and mac = H(TCert MU ||sk i+1 ||Other) and sends the roaming message {m i , mac} to the FA, where sk i+1 is a session key for the next communication.
L2. FA: m i , mac
When received the roaming message from the MU, the FA calculates the session key and decrypts m i . The FA then checks the validity of mac. If it is valid, the FA updates the session key sk i with sk i+1 for the next communication.
Advantages of Li's Scheme
Li's scheme has two advantages. First, the MU calculates H(PW MU ⊕r n ) and sends this message to HA. In other words, the MU chooses PW MU and sends it to the HA; this prevents PW MU from being calculated easily, which was a shortcoming of previous schemes. Second, Li's scheme is more efficient in terms of performance because it uses the lightweight elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman computation compared with other traditional schemes that use heavyweight asymmetric cryptosystems with certificates.
Weaknesses of Li's Scheme
Li's scheme has two weaknesses. First, because ID HA is not properly hidden, an attacker can easily intercept it and determine the relationships among the MU, FA, and HA. In addition, it does not use an authentication mechanism between the MU and the FA, and therefore, for any message m 1 to the FA, the FA performs the appropriate processing and transfers the results to HA. Because of this feature, the attacker can flood a specific target (HA), intercept other people's message (m 1 ) over the wireless network, and change the message timestamp T MU . Although the message will not be verified through the HA, the attacker can do enough to cripple a specific target host (HA), namely, the attacker can perform a distributed denial-of-service attack. Second, Li's scheme does not clearly define or address some important issues, such as the assignment of session key computation during the roaming phase and how to manage the various session keys for a large number of users. If there are hundreds of thousands of people in a wireless network environment, and each person's session key is different, managing the keys is not trivial. Table 2 shows a detailed description of the weaknesses of Li's scheme [18] . Table 2 . Weaknesses of Li's scheme.
Step Phase Descriptions
V1 Authentication phase
Because ID HA is transmitted in plaintext, the attacker can intercept messages and determine the relationship among the MU, FA, and HA. Then, the attacker can use a replay attack and target a specific object, namely the HA, by a distributed denial-of-service attack.
L2 Roaming phase
Li's scheme does not clearly explain how to obtain corresponding session keys and the relationship between different users. So FA is impossible for a user to calculate the specific session key, and decrypt m i . Therefore, this scheme lacks integrity.
Proposed Scheme
The proposed scheme consists of three phases: registration, authentication, and roaming, of which the authentication phase is real-time online.
Notations
The proposed scheme uses the same notations as those in Table 1 and the new notations listed in Table 3 . Figure 1 shows the registration phase of the proposed scheme. The detailed steps as follows.
The MU chooses ID MU , PW MU , and a random number r n and calculates H 2 (PW MU ⊕r n ). Then, the MU sends the message {ID MU , H 2 (PW MU ⊕r n )} to the HA.
R2
. HA→MU: m R2 {ID HA , E p , E, n, P, P HA , z i , H(.), W i } When the message H 2 (PW MU ⊕r n ) is received from the MU, the HA calculates z i = H 2 (PW MU ⊕r n ) ⊕H 1 (ID MU ||N||W i )⊕H 3 (W i ). Then, the HA chooses a random number w, calculates W i = wP, and transmits {ID HA , E p , E, n, P, P HA , z i , W i , H(.)} to the MU.
R3
. MU: ID HA , E p , E, n, P, P HA , z i , W i , H(.)
The MU enters W i into his/her smart card, and the MU's smart card contains ID HA , E p , E, n, P, P HA , z i , W i , and H(.) Figure 1 . Registration phase. Figure 2 shows the authentication phase of the proposed scheme. The steps are detailed as follows.
Authentication Phase

V1. MU→FA: mV1{A, U}
The U inserts the smart card into the card reader and enters IDMU and PWMU. Then, the smart card chooses a random number x and calculates X = xP, X1 = xPHA, ZP = [zi⊕H2(PWMU⊕rn)⊕ H3(Wi)]P], IND = IDMU⊕H1(X1||TMU), c1 = H(X1||Z), and A = aP, where TMU is the MU's timestamp. Subsequently, the MU calculates a shared key EC = aY = ayP, the message U = (Wi, X, IND, c1, IDHA, TMU)EC, and sends an authentication request message {A, U} to the FA. 
V4. FA→MU: mV4{c2 = (TCertMU)sk}
The HA checks the validity of the timestamp THA. If it is valid, the FA calculates MACHA = H1(Wi||X||Y||IDFA||IDHA||THA||SKHF) and verifies whether this value is the same as the received MACHA. If it is not valid, the FA terminates the execution. Otherwise, the FA believes that the MU is an authenticated user. The FA then calculates MACHA = MAC'HA⊕H1(THA||SKHF), Y = yP, and sk = yX = xyP and sends the message {c2 = (TCertMU)sk} to the MU, where TCertMU is a temporary certificate from the FA to the MU.
V5. MU: Y, c2 = (TCertMU)sk
The MU calculates a session key sk' = xY = xyP = sk and decrypts c2. Finally, the MU obtains TCertMU from the FA. Figure 2 shows the authentication phase of the proposed scheme. The steps are detailed as follows. Figure 3 shows the roaming phase of the proposed scheme. The steps are detailed as follows.
Authentication Phase
Roaming Phase
L1. MU→FA: mRo1{A, U}
The MU calculates mi = (TCertMU||ski+1||Other)ski, mac = H(TCertMU||ski+1||Other), and (mi||mac||ski||TMU)EC and sends the message {A, U} to the FA, where ski+1 is a session key for the next communication and TMU is the current timestamp.
L2. FA: A, U
The FA calculates aA = abP = EC and decrypts U to obtain mi, mac, ski, and TMU. The FA then checks the validity of TMU. If it is valid, the FA decrypts mi by using ski and calculates mac' = H(TCertMU||ski+1||Other). If the equation mac' = mac holds, the FA updates the session key ski with ski+1 for the next communication. 
BAN-Logic Analysis
Introduction to BAN-Logic
BAN-logic is used to establish session key security between the MU and the FA to prove that the session key is safeguarded in the authentication phase of our scheme. The main process has four proofs: Figure 3 shows the roaming phase of the proposed scheme. The steps are detailed as follows. Figure 3 shows the roaming phase of the proposed scheme. The steps are detailed as follows.
Roaming Phase
L1. MU→FA: mRo1{A, U}
L2. FA: A, U
BAN-Logic Analysis
Introduction to BAN-Logic
BAN-logic is used to establish session key security between the MU and the FA to prove that the session key is safeguarded in the authentication phase of our scheme. The main process has four proofs: 
BAN-Logic Analysis
Introduction to BAN-Logic
BAN-logic is used to establish session key security between the MU and the FA to prove that the session key is safeguarded in the authentication phase of our scheme. The main process has four proofs: a.
MU believes the session key: MU←-SK-→FA b.
MU believes that FA believed the session key: MU←-SK-→FA c.
A believes the session key: MU←-SK-→FA d.
FA believes that MU believed the session key: MU←-SK-→FA According to the BAN-logic characteristics of the security analysis, the following basic symbolic representation rules are used [29] [30] [31] 1.
(X, Y): X or Y is one part of the parameter (X, Y).
2.
<X>Y: X can be obtained through the secret parameter Y. 3.
{X} K : X is encrypted under the key K. 4.
P←-K-→Q: P and Q may use the shared secret key K to communicate. The third party does not know the secret key K.
5.
P<=S=>Q: S is only known between P and Q. P and Q must use S to prove the identity of each other.
Rules of BAN-Logic
Freshness rule: If part of the message is fresh, then the whole message is also fresh. Message meaning rule: K is a key shared between P and Q; therefore, if P sees an encrypted message, it must come from Q.
Nonce verification rule: If P believes that Q once said X, then P believes that Q once believed X. If X is fresh, then Q should still hold this belief.
2.
By m V1 , A1, and A6, we apply the nonce verification rule to derive From the foregoing analysis, we can find a consistent result with assumption A11 and Statement 16. Therefore, this indicates that Assumption A11 is established, and this also proves that the process of setting the session key is safe between the MU and the FA in our proposed scheme.
Security Analysis
In the authentication phase of our proposed scheme, we improved the session key ID HA by using symmetric encryption computation, compared with Li's scheme that does not perform any encryption protection. Therefore, the anonymity level of the proposed scheme is even stronger than that of Li's scheme. In other words, the security level increased from C2 to C3 (in [13] , the C2 level means that the FA does not know the identity of the anonymous user, and the C3 level means that the attacker does not know the relationship among the MU, FA and HA) Hence, the attacker cannot intercept ID HA and cannot use replay attacks to paralyze the HA. In addition, for the problem of generating the session key in the roaming phase, our approach lets the MU encrypt the calculated session key by using the shared key EC and transmits it to the FA. Therefore, no problems are encountered during transmission. The FA does not need to recalculate the session key, and therefore, the amount of computation is reduced because there is no additional matching of session keys to individual MUs. Finally, the computation of the session key is balanced between the sender and the receiver in the authentication phase. In this section, we show that the proposed scheme can withstand some possible attacks and affords several good security properties.
Resist Replay Attack
The proposed scheme has a timestamp in each transmission process, including the authentication (V1→V5) and roaming (L1→L2) phases. In addition, V1 and L1 are encrypted by using the shared key EC, and therefore, we can imagine that V1 and L1 are secure channels. Therefore, even if an attacker intercepts the message, the message cannot be broken in this secure channel. This allows our proposed scheme to resist replay attacks.
Resist Distributed Denial-of-Service Attack
The attacker can intercept the cipher text of message m 1 that contains the timestamp T MU and ID HA . However, the attacker cannot decrypt the cipher text and cannot forge the timestamp T MU and specific object ID HA . Then, the attacker cannot use a distributed denial-of-service attack to attack the HA.
Achieve High Level of Anonymity
In a wireless environment, messages can be intercepted easily. In [27] , the MU sends the authentication message m 1 to the FA in the authentication phase. The message content is not encrypted, and therefore, the attacker easily intercepts ID HA and then determines the relationship among the MA, FA, and HA. When the relationship is known, the level of anonymity of the entire scheme is lowered, and the attacker can successfully use the attacks described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. In our proposed scheme, when the MU wants to send the message to the FA, it will calculate the shared key EC and then encrypt the message by using EC to achieve the security and integrity requirements. Only the FA possesses the EC, and therefore, other people cannot decrypt this cipher text. Therefore, our scheme can achieve the C3 level requirement of high anonymity.
Solve Corresponding Problem of Session Key in Roaming Phase
In Li's scheme, when the FA receives the roaming message, it calculates the session key, decrypts the cipher text m i , and performs a comparison with mac. However, there are in fact hundreds of thousands of people in a wireless network environment, and Li's scheme did not clearly discuss how to calculate the session key in the roaming phase. Each person's session key is not the same, and it did not clarify how to calculate one hundred thousand different session keys or save them in the table. It can be saved as a form, but this may pose some risks, which need to be discussed further. In the proposed scheme, the FA can decrypt the cipher text m i by using the session key calculated by the MU in the authentication phase. On the other hand, we encrypt the session key by using EC calculated by the MU in the authentication phase. In this manner, our scheme resists data disclosure to attackers, who intercept the session key during the transfer processes. Even if the message is intercepted, it can only reveal the cipher text. Therefore, the proposed scheme solves the corresponding problem of the session key.
Balanced Calculation of Session Key
The load of session key computation is balanced between the senders and the receivers in the authentication phase. Table 4 shows the balanced calculation of the session key. Table 5 shows that the proposed scheme can resist internal attack, replay attack, and distributed denial-of-service attack for the specific object while maintaining a high level of anonymity. It provides a balanced calculation and solves the issue of session key management. Li's scheme cannot resist replay attack or distributed denial-of-service attack for the specific object while also providing less anonymity of level C2. Li's scheme did not address the problem of session key management as calculated by the FA in the roaming phase. However, our proposed scheme resolves these issues. Our method maintains the advantages and weaknesses of Zhu and Ma's [24] 
Comparison with Related Works
Conclusions
This study proposes an elliptic-curve-based authentication scheme with roaming service and user anonymity for mobile communication. It overcomes the weaknesses of Li's scheme [27] and provides balanced session key computation in the authentication phase. We use an elliptic curve in the calculations, and therefore, the security performance is good. Although our computational complexity is comparable to that of Li's scheme, our scheme reduces the load of MU calculation by moving this calculation to the HA, which has better computing performance. Finally, the advantages and weaknesses of our scheme are compared with those of other related works, and it demonstrates improved security, anonymity, and resistance to attacks without having additional computational complexity.
